In 1959, at the University of Tehran, the Iranian Shah established the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre and initiated negotiations with the US under AFP for civilian nuclear support. In 1967, the US established a 5 MW nuclear reactor with highly enriched uranium fuel to fuel the reactor at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (NRC), which had the capacity to produce 600 g of plutonium per year in spent fuel. Akbar Etemad was the father of the INP. Under the AFP, Iranian scientists also got an opportunity to get trained in the US. In 1974, Iran created the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran to achieve the target of training manpower for 20 reactors in the next 20 years. Subsequently, in 1975, the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran and MIT entered into an agreement to train Iranian nuclear scientists.
Things changed after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. When the rule of the Shah came to an end in 1979, the US suspended all nuclear cooperation with Iran. Iran, on the other hand, continued to receive support from Russia, China and Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear arms bazaar. Russians helped Iranians in building a heavy water reactor in Iran that has capabilities to produce weapons-grade plutonium. China assisted Iran with two sub-critical reactors and electromagnetic isotope separation technology for the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre.
local expertise. Finally, due to the US pressure, however, the IAEA did not initiate any support. As time progressed, the US applied more pressure on the IAEA and other states to refrain from citing Iran. In 1995, then Iranian President Rafsanjani decided to break the ice and began to improve He gave a firm named Conoco a contract on 6 May 1995 to develop an Iranian offshore oil field in the Persian Gulf but the Clinton administration prevented the firm from going ahead. Clinton continued sanctions against Iran while Rafsanjani signed an agreement with Russia to begin work on completing the incomplete Bushehr plant.
From 1976 to 2003, as per the subsidiary arrangements of the safeguards agreement between Iran and the IAEA, Iran had to report any new facility to the IAEA within 180 days along with providing information on any new location or outside the facility. Since 1992, the subsidiary arrangement that was part of the safeguard agreement began to change but Iran was not a party to change in the safeguard agreements till 2003. The Iranian opposition party, Mujahideen Khalq Organisation (MKO), revealed that Iran had established a secret facility at Natanz. As Iran was not a party to the changing safeguard agreements until 2003, by not declaring the Natanz facility within 180 days, it did not violate any legal obligation of the IAEA.
Since 1992, the Board of Governors at the IAEA began to accept the subsidiary arrangement called modified Code 3.1, which required a member state to notify any decision to set up a new facility immediately. In 2003, Iran agreed to abide by the modified Code 3.1, but as the US sanctions continued, Iran refused to finally ratify the code. Iran began negotiations with the EU-3, that is, Britain, France and Germany. The talks led to the adoption of Sadabad Declaration between Iran, Britain, France and Germany, whereby Iran decided to suspend all uranium enrichment.
This was followed in 2004 with the Paris Agreement. Under this, it was agreed that Iran and EU-3 will look for a long-term agreement to ensure an INP for peaceful purposes. The Sadabad Declaration and the Paris Agreement failed as Iran ud not get a security guarantee for any attack on Iran. Iran said that it got a box of chocolates out of deals, which was empty. Since 2006, Iran resumed enriched at its facility in Natanz. The belligerent policy of the US on Iran gave rise to a hardliner in Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who became the next president. The refusal of Iran to ratify the modified Code 3.1 led the US to send the Iranian dossier for sanctions to the UN Security Council. In 2009, Iran sent a letter to the IAEA declaring that it is constructing a second uranium enrichment facility at Fordo under the mountain.
As the Iranian Majles had not ratified the modified Code 3.1, it was not bound to follow. Tensions between the US and Iran continued. In 2006, China, Russia and the US joined the group of EU-3, becoming the P5 + 1. Germany was a key trading partner of Iran and its nuclear programme depended upon German products and services. German firms like Siemens, MercedRLngi, Krapp and Volkswagen were also heavily operational with Iran. The negotiations of P5 +1 did not yield any results due to the presence of the hardliner Ahmadinejad.